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*RESUBMIT GLD-404

NOT PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
___________
No. 13-2184
___________
PATRICK S. MCPHERRON,
Appellant
v.
THOMAS HOGAN; THE DISTRICT ATTORNEY OF THE
COUNTY OF CHESTER COUNTY; THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
OF THE STATE OF PENNSYLVANIA
____________________________________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. Civ. No. 2-12-cv-00589)
District Judge: Honorable J. Curtis Joyner
____________________________________
Submitted on Appellant’s Request for a Certificate of
Appealability Under 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1) and for Possible
Summary Action Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6
August 22, 2013
Before: FUENTES, FISHER and VANASKIE, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed: September 19, 2013)
_________
OPINION
_________
PER CURIAM
Patrick S. McPherron filed pro se a habeas petition challenging his 2010
convictions by the Pennsylvania Court of Common Pleas for Chester County. The

District Court denied the petition in its entirety with prejudice as procedurally defaulted.
The District Court, which adopted the Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendation
(“R&R”), relied in part on the Magistrate Judge’s conclusions that McPherron has not
sought relief under Pennsylvania’s Post Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”), 42 Pa. Cons.
Stat. §§ 9541-9546, and that his time for doing so has expired. (R&R at 7, 8.)
McPherron seeks a certificate of appealability (“COA”).
In reviewing McPherron’s application, we noted that he actually has until January
14, 2014, to file a PCRA petition.1 We further noted that that fact might make certain of
his claims unexhausted rather than procedurally defaulted, and we directed the
Commonwealth to show cause why the District Court’s judgment should not be vacated
and this matter remanded for that reason. In response, the Commonwealth appears to
agree that McPherron still has time to file a PCRA petition. The Commonwealth has not
shown cause why we should not vacate and remand, however, and indeed has not argued
that this appeal should be resolved in any particular way. We now grant McPherron’s
application for a COA2 and will vacate and remand for further proceedings.

1

PCRA petitions generally must be filed “within one year of the date the judgment
becomes final.” 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 9545(b)(1). “[A] judgment becomes final at the
conclusion of direct review, including discretionary review in the Supreme Court of the
United States and the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, or at the expiration of time for
seeking the review.” Id. § 9545(b)(3). The Pennsylvania Supreme Court denied
allowance of appeal on May 31, 2012, and denied rehearing on June 22, 2012. The
United States Supreme Court then denied certiorari on January 14, 2013 (No. 12-7240).
2

Jurists of reason would debate both the District Court’s procedural ruling and whether
the claims noted below state valid claims of the denial of a constitutional right,
particularly in light of the fact that the District Court did not reach the merits of those
claims. See 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2); Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000);
2

Whether McPherron’s ability to file a PCRA petition undermines the District
Court’s procedural default analysis depends on whether he asserted claims that he may
still bring under the PCRA. The District Court’s conclusion that McPherron’s time to
seek PCRA relief has expired left it with no need to make that determination, but we will
remand for it to do so now. In that regard, we note that some of McPherron’s assertions
could be read as attempts to assert claims that he may still bring under the PCRA. In
Ground Two of his habeas petition, for example, he challenges the validity of a warrant
and asserts that “I told public defender witness perjured herself at preliminary hearing,
had proof, and they did nothing.” (ECF No. 4 at 7.) Pennsylvania defendants generally
must raise claims of ineffective assistance of counsel in a PCRA petition rather than on
direct appeal. See Commonwealth v. Grant, 813 A.2d 726, 738 (Pa. 2002).
In addition, in Ground Four, McPherron challenges the withholding of allegedly
exculpatory evidence and asserts that “I’m in forma pauperis, so the state won’t even
send me a free copy of the transcripts[.]” (Id. at 11.) This assertion potentially states a
claim of the denial of transcripts for use on appeal in violation of Griffin v. Illinois, 351
U.S. 12, 19 (1956). Although we do not decide the issue, it appears that Pennsylvania
courts sometimes review similar claims in the first instance under the PCRA. See
Commonwealth v. Williams, 950 A.2d 294, 317-18 (Pa. 2008).
We recognize that McPherron’s filings are largely delusional or incoherent and
that he has not set these assertions forth as discrete claims for relief or developed them in
Morris v. Horn, 187 F.3d 333, 341 (3d Cir. 1999). We thus have jurisdiction under 28
U.S.C. § 1291.
3

any meaningful way. Given the liberal construction afforded to pro se filings, however, it
appears that McPherron may be attempting to seek relief on potentially valid grounds that
he can still raise in state court. As the District Court’s ruling now stands, McPherron
would not be able to file another federal habeas petition after exhausting such claims in
state court without satisfying the stringent requirements of 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b), which
any claims he may currently have necessarily do not do.
Thus, in an abundance of caution, we will vacate and remand. On remand, the
District Court should determine whether McPherron has asserted any claim that he still
has an opportunity to exhaust in state court and, if so, take such further action as may be
appropriate with respect to his “mixed” petition. See Rhines v. Weber, 544 U.S. 269,
273, 278 (2005); 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(2). McPherron’s other motions are denied.3

3

We do not reach the substance of the District Court’s procedural default analysis
because one of the options in addressing a mixed petition is to dismiss it in its entirety
without prejudice so that the petitioner can file a completely exhausted petition in the
future. See Rhines, 544 U.S. at 274. We nevertheless note that, although the
Pennsylvania Superior Court appears to have deemed McPherron’s claims waived on
direct appeal under Pa. R. App. P. 2119(a), and not under the rules referenced in the
R&R, McPherron has given us no reason to question the District Court’s analysis.
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